If anything serves the Pakistan Military best, it is the country in crisis. Pakistan's military establishment artfully uses internal and external crises to its benefit. Continuous crisis in the country's internal and external affairs suits the military establishment the best: it plays on these mostly unfounded fears to consolidate its base.

In such a situation, which is consistently presented as volatile and hostile, the civilian leaders are powerless and more dependent on the military establishment. No wonder most speeches by the latest dispensation and political leaders of Pakistan, including the Prime Minister, are centred on praising the country's powerful military, the Chief of Defence Forces (CDF), and Field Marshal Gen Asim Munir. On almost every occasion, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has been playing to the gallery, and the gallery consists of the Army Chief Asim Munir. He appears servile and consistently seeks approval from the military.

How can an elected government be so submissive to the country's armed forces that are supposed to be operating under civilian authority? As pointed out by political scientist C. Christine Fair in her book, Fighting to the End, while the rule is that a country has an army, in Pakistan the Army has a country. The military does not draw its legitimacy from the people or from its allegiance to the civilian leaders, but civilian governments come to power and survive because of the needs and requirements of the military.

This lopsided relationship is shaped and dominated by the military. If a political leader falls out of favour with the military, she or he is sent packing. Imran Khan was the latest victim of the policy. That is the reason that the Sharif regime is doing everything, not to serve the people but to keep the generals happy.

To give just one example: in May, Sharif telephoned Asim Munir and other generals to extend Eid greetings and said that 'the nation was proud of its brave soldiers and the unwavering commitment and sacrifices of the armed forces of Pakistan.' This behaviour is a reflection of the policy in which the civilian leadership has fully surrendered to the military establishment.

In an interview, Defence Minister Khawaja Asif had rather barefacedly accepted that 'This is a hybrid model. It's not an ideal democratic government … So, this arrangement, the hybrid arrangement, I think [it] is doing wonders.'

Even this doesn't seem enough for the military establishment. Sensing an opportunity while the civilian leadership is keen to go the extra mile to show its loyalty to it, the military establishment planned more concessions and power to itself. It seemed to have taken a few lessons from Gen Pervez Musharraf, who was charged with murder and sentenced (which was never carried out).

An amendment tailored for the generals

After being appointed as the Field Marshall, Asim Munir came up with the idea of introducing the 27th Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan. The news of the amendment raised serious debates in the country. The amendment tweaked Article 243 of the Constitution of Pakistan, which has been used in the past to tilt civil-military relations. Article 243 deals with the relationship between Pakistan's civilian government and the military; the Article should have mandated civilian leadership as the dominant actor; that has never been the case in Pakistan.

The military establishment from the Zia era has introduced amendment after amendment to tailor it to serve and defend its interests. After the 1977 coup, to sideline the Prime Minister, Zia introduced the 8th Amendment, empowering himself to appoint the service chiefs and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. Though Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, through the 13th Amendment, tried to restore the authority of the prime minister in 1997, Gen Pervez Musharraf rolled it back via the 17th Amendment in 2003 after overthrowing Nawaz Sharif in 1999.

Over the last few years, however, the military has succeeded in utilising one crisis after another, which may surprisingly be its own making, to strengthen its control. The military's iron grip overshadows the governance domain that apparently belongs to the civilian authority: the military establishment is also deciding governance-related matters, apart from the country's defence, domestic politics and foreign policy. If the judiciary were to carry out its constitutional functions but those don't suit the generals, efforts are made to ensure it remains under control.

From the role in helping the Afghan Taliban to return to Kabul (that is now proving to be a disaster for Islamabad), the 9 May 2023 protests in the wake of Imran Khan's arrests, surge in armed attacks within the country and then the 4-day conflict with India in May 2024, among others, all have played in the military's favour.

Conflict as a blessing

No sooner was Gen. Asim Munir made Field Marshal after the May conflict with India than the military designed the plan to introduce the 27th Amendment. Thus, the conflict with India was a blessing for the military. It helped it to create a narrative as if India had waged a full-fledged war and the Pakistan military was strong enough to defend the country, ignoring the fact that 'Operation Sindoor' was just a military riposte against terror sanctuaries, not a conventional, full-fledged war.

All the same, Asim Munir lobbied the toothless Shehbaz Sharif regime to introduce the 27th Amendment in Parliament to further Article 243 in the generals' favour. The bill mainly aimed to empower the military establishment further and weaken the judiciary, which was seen at times favouring Imran Khan, which didn't suit the generals.

Bilawal Bhutto, the chairman of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), the second-largest party in the National Assembly and an ally in the federal government, brazenly said, 'After the victory (against India) in the May conflict, the PPP has openly expressed its support for the respect and recognition earned by the armed forces, emphasising that this acknowledgement deserves constitutional protection.' Such a statement from a top political leader and former foreign minister of the country invokes nothing but amusement.

Why does a self-proclaimed successful operation of the military need to be constitutionally protected at the cost of the authority of the civilian leadership? And amusingly, members of the ruling regime appeared to willingly concede ground to the military.

A crony government

The reality is Pakistan's political structure is less about governance and accountability of the civilian rulers than serving the interests of the military establishment. From being constitutionally empowered and protected to making the generals part of the federal government bodies like the Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC) has made it clear that a military model is enshrined in politics and the military establishment retains an unassailable supremacy that defines Pakistan's enduring civil-military imbalance.

At the same time, with the legal protection and authority, it has made the civilian government look like a crony that implements the policies of the generals. While this goes on, the common people of Pakistan endure hardship and troubles.