The recent imposition of emergency rule and governor's rule in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa by Pakistan’s federal government on 11 October reveals how the country’s civilian leaders played a role in the erosion of the democratic institutions they champion and defend. President Asif Ali Zardari approved the measures under Articles 232 and 234 of Pakistan's Constitution upon the advice of Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, placing the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI)-ruled province under federal administration. The government cited rising militancy and the provincial administration's non-cooperation in counter-terrorism operations as reasons for invoking the emergency provisions and dismissing the elected government.

This incident shows that Pakistan's democratic erosion cannot be attributed only to the military establishment, as the role of civilian leaders has also been as critical in facilitating this erosion. The two most prominent families in Pakistan's political history and their political parties, the Bhuttos and their Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and the Sharifs and their Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N), who have controlled civilian politics in the country for decades, have repeatedly flouted democratic norms when their own power has been threatened. They have dismissed provincial administrations, resorted to extraordinary constitutional provisions, and consistently persecuted their political opponents. In essence, their actions have laid the very precedents that the military has subsequently exploited to dominate national politics.

The Bhutto family’s record shows this contradiction. When Sheikh Mujibur Rahman led the Awami League, it secured a clear majority in the National Assembly of undivided Pakistan in the country's first general election in 1970; the military regime of General Yahya Khan postponed the assembly's convening at the insistence of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Bhutto, whose Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) had won most seats in West Pakistan, opposed the simple transfer of power to the Awami League. The subsequent political crisis, military crackdown, and war culminated in the formation of Bangladesh in December 1971. The responsibility for the split lay with both the military and political leadership, with Bhutto’s refusal to accept the electoral consequences of the Awami League’s victory damaging the very democratic principle that parliamentary majorities should determine who governs.

Another example is Bhutto's treatment of Balochistan. On 14 February 1973, Bhutto, then as president of Pakistan, dismissed the provincial government under Chief Minister Sardar Ataullah Mengal of the National Awami Party and the Governor Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo. The government referred to civil unrest in the province and weapons found in the Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad as a carte blanche for its actions. Islamabad imposed governor's rule in the province while also launching a major military operation against Baloch rebels. Thus, the crisis increased dissatisfaction in a region that had always been very wary of any centralisation.

Bhutto’s own government fell to General Zia-ul-Haq’s coup on 5 July 1977, after opposition protests over allegations of widespread rigging in the March general election. These allegations and subsequent unrest created a crisis, but the military took advantage of it to change the constitutional order. Bhutto was hanged in April 1979 after an extremely controversial trial. It demonstrates not only the possibility of removing a civilian leader by the military, but also how malpractice during elections and the suppression of opposition provide the armed forces with the opportunity to present themselves as a solution to the crisis created by politicians.

Benazir Bhutto did nothing to break this pattern of her father. In 1994, she dismissed the Pir Sabir Shah-led provincial government of North-West Frontier Province, now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, placing the province under the governor's rule. The decision reflected a broader tendency among national parties to treat provincial governments as political possessions rather than elected institutions entitled to complete their terms. President Asif Ali Zardari did the same thing. In February 2009, he imposed governor's rule in Punjab after the Supreme Court disqualified Nawaz Sharif and Shehbaz Sharif, resulting in the removal of Shehbaz and his cabinet from power. The intervention lasted one month and was seen as an effort to undermine the PML-N in its stronghold.

Similarly, the central government under the PPP in January 2013 dismissed the Balochistan provincial government following violent attacks on the Hazara Shias living in Quetta and their protests against the lack of protection from the government. Prime Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf announced the dismissal, and Governor Nawab Zulfiqar Magsi assumed responsibility for the provincial administration. While the scale of violence necessitated accountability, the PPP government’s decision to impose governor’s rule reinforced the pattern of the federal government taking control from the democratically elected representatives at the slightest hint of a provincial governance crisis.

As for the Sharif family, there is a history of their own inconsistency when it comes to defending democracy and democratic institutions of the country. It is an open knowledge now that Nawaz Sharif's political success was facilitated by the establishment's hostility toward the PPP in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The Supreme Court judgment in the Asghar Khan case in 2012 showed that military intelligence officials allocated funds to support the election victories of politicians opposed to Benazir Bhutto in the 1990 elections.

After coming to power, Sharif also resorted to exceptional methods. After Pakistan conducted its nuclear tests in May 1998, his government announced a state of emergency in the country and suspended constitutional rights in the face of international pressure. In Balochistan province, the government led by Chief Minister Sardar Akhtar Mengal collapsed in 1998 due to political differences with the central authorities. Sharif’s government was itself toppled by General Pervez Musharraf in October 1999 following the Kargil War. Sharif’s legacy shows the weakness of civilian administration when democratic norms are not considered binding.

Such events are more useful for the army than for Pakistan. When civilian leaders manipulate elections, dismiss provincial governments or resort to the state apparatus to punish opponents, they weaken public confidence and erode trust in democratic institutions. This also allows the military establishment to propagate itself as an irreplaceable stabiliser. Political parties also lose the credibility needed to resist military pressure when they seek support from the very establishment against their rivals.

The current intervention in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa must be judged against this history. Pakistan faces a genuine security challenge, and provincial authorities must answer legitimate questions about their counterterrorism performance. But emergency powers require clear evidence, strict constitutional scrutiny, parliamentary oversight and a defined path back to elected administration. The federal government must demonstrate that its action is necessary and proportionate, rather than a means of removing PTI from power ahead of planned protests.

The Bhuttos and Sharifs have both suffered from military intervention, yet their own governments have repeatedly weakened the democratic safeguards that might have constrained it. Pakistan’s democracy will remain fragile while political dynasties treat constitutional principles as instruments of convenience. Each intervention may offer a short-term advantage to the party in power, but it strengthens an institution that has repeatedly displaced civilian authority. The ultimate cost falls on Pakistan’s citizens, whose votes matter less each time elected leaders help make military dominance appear necessary.